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Niehauser: A Forgotten Unfairness

A FORGOTTEN UNFAIRNESS: TAKING A “BITE” OUT OF
STATE OCCUPATIONAL CERTIFICATION AND REGISTRATION
REGULATIONS
Brett Niehauser *

I. INTRODUCTION
With the recent Sensational Smiles, LLC v. Mullen 1 decision, the
Second Circuit has reignited a debate regarding how courts should
review state economic regulations, specifically ones affecting
employment. This legal dispute, which beckons back to the time of
Lochner v. New York, 2 has developed a refreshed exposure over the past
fifteen years. The Sensational Smiles decision upheld a state regulation
that permitted only licensed dentists to perform teeth-whitening
services. This recent renewal has primarily focused on state regulations
that “protect” licensed professionals by allowing only these licensed
individuals to perform certain services for consumers. Therefore, much
of the commentary surrounding the issue of the appropriate standard of
review to apply to such regulations has principally revolved around
challenges to such occupational licensing regulations. 3
Nevertheless, similar, yet somewhat forgotten, state regulations have
perhaps even greater implications on the ability of individuals to
perform certain occupational services. State occupational certification
and registration regulations impose analogous restrictions as licensing
schemes on individuals seeking to provide services to society, but these
specific regulations repeatedly lack the reasonable connection that
should exist between a regulatory regime and the stated governmental
purpose. As a result, occupational certification and registration
regulations are often more deserving of heightened review than even
occupational licensing regulations. Modern courts are increasingly
recognizing this in adjudicating these regulatory challenges. 4
One heightened standard advocated for in reviewing such regulations

* Associate Member, 2015-2016 University of Cincinnati Law Review.
1. 793 F.3d 281 (2d Cir. 2015).
2. 198 U.S. 45 (1905). Lochner is generally considered a seminal case involving judicial
review of state regulations that interfere with an individual’s claim to economic liberty.
3. See, e.g., Marc P. Florman, The Harmless Pursuit Of Happiness: Why “Rational Basis With
Bite” Review Makes Sense For Challenges To Occupational Licenses, 58 LOY. L. REV. 721 (2012);
Roger V. Abbott, Is Economic Protectionism A Legitimate Governmental Interest Under Rational Basis
Review?, 62 CATH. U. L. REV. 475 (2013).
4. Bokhari v. Metro. Gov’t of Nashville & Davidson Cnty., 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 171103
(M.D. Tenn. Dec. 3, 2012); Bruner v. Zawacki, 997 F. Supp. 2d 691 (E.D. Ky. 2014); Shimose v. Haw.
Health Sys. Corp., 345 P.3d 145 (Haw. 2015).
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is provided in the Supreme Court’s decision in City of Cleburne v.
Cleburne Living Center, 5 which represented an instance of the Court
distancing itself from traditional rational basis review. After reversing
the Fifth Circuit’s determination that mental disability was a quasisuspect classification deserving protection under intermediate scrutiny,
the Court nonetheless implied that a standard of review less deferential
than traditional rational basis was appropriate.6 A justification for this
heightened review was the Court’s recognition of the intellectually
disadvantaged as a “politically unpopular group.” 7 As a result, a zoning
ordinance that required permits for the operation of group homes for the
intellectually disadvantaged was found not to have satisfied this
heightened rational basis review. 8
Using this “rational basis with bite,” 9 the Court could not find a
rational relationship between the individual qualities of the intellectually
disadvantaged and the prohibition from them living in a group home,
especially when there were no similar restrictions for any other groups
of people. 10 Since these homes had already been functioning in a highly
regulated atmosphere, the court deemed the ordinance as signifying
nothing more than an unfounded prejudice against the intellectually
disadvantaged. 11
In light of Sensational Smiles, the current circuit split reflects a
conflict over whether traditional rational basis review or some sort of
heightened review, such as that set forth in Cleburne, is more
appropriate when examining occupational licensing regulations. 12
Given the lack of lobbying power of industry outsiders, this comment
will argue that courts should view all occupational regulatory schemes
under the lens of Cleburne when such schemes are challenged pursuant
to the Equal Protection Clause. Additionally, this comment will expose

5. 473 U.S. 432 (1985).
6. Id. at 442 (1985).
7. Id. at 447.
8. Id. at 447–50.
9. See Gayle Lynn Pettinga, Rational Basis with Bite: Intermediate Scrutiny by Any Other
Name, 62 IND. L.J. 779 (1987).
10. See id. at 449–50.
11. Id. at 450.
12. Sensational Smiles, LLC v. Mullen, 793 F.3d 281, 284 (2d Cir. 2015) (finding a rational
basis exists for the Connecticut regulation under traditional rational basis); St. Joseph Abbey v. Castille,
712 F.3d 215, 227 (5th Cir. 2013) (finding a Louisiana regulation not to have a rational basis and
invalidating it); Merrifield v. Lockyer, 547 F.3d 978, 988 (9th Cir. 2008) (upholding a California
licensing scheme under traditional rational basis review); Powers v. Harris, 379 F.3d 1208, 1224 (10th
Cir. 2004) (finding judicial review pursuant to traditional rational basis appropriate and upholding the
Oklahoma licensing scheme under this standard); Craigmiles v. Giles, 312 F.3d 220, 229 (6th Cir. 2002)
(finding the Tennessee regulation anticompetitive in nature and that it could not survive rational basis
review).
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the Second Circuit’s misconstruing of Supreme Court precedent, 13
which provided the foundation for that court’s misplaced reliance on a
heightened degree of judicial deference as being most appropriate in
addressing all forms of preferential economic legislation. With the
general reasoning behind Sensational Smiles in doubt, Cleburne’s
advocacy of a more searching standard than traditional rational basis
review becomes more supportable. The inconsistent review of prior
occupational regulations, which has produced illogical and unjustified
results, further buttresses this stricter standard.
Furthermore, in terms of occupational certification and registration
requirements, an all-too-common lack of valid connection between these
regulations and the police power—under which such regulations are
often rationalized—demonstrates the need for a broader application of
heightened review beyond licensing regulations. 14 Moreover, the
modern trend of lower courts scrutinizing state occupational action
beyond traditional rational basis review lends credence to the notion that
there is increasing momentum for employing an increased form of
rational basis review. 15 Finally, given the concern expressed by some
regarding a potential lack of proper constraints on the use of such
review, the Supreme Court has established an easily adaptable
framework that can provide guidelines for courts that would limit
heightened rational basis review to anticompetitive occupational
regulation schemes. 16
II. BACKGROUND
In Sensational Smiles, the Second Circuit reviewed the Connecticut
State Dental Commission’s declaratory ruling that only licensed dentists
were allowed to offer teeth-whitening procedures. The court explicitly
reviewed this ruling under traditional rational basis review, under which
a classification must be upheld if there is a rational relationship between
the classification set forth in the legislation and a legitimate
governmental purpose. 17 First, the Second Circuit recognized the
government’s legitimate and undisputed interest in maintaining the
13. Sensational Smiles, 793 F.3d at 286–87.
14. See generally Bokhari v. Metro. Gov’t of Nashville & Davidson Cnty., 2012 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 171103 (M.D. Tenn. Dec. 3, 2012); Bruner v. Zawacki, 997 F. Supp. 2d 691 (E.D. Ky. 2014);
Shimose v. Haw. Health Sys. Corp., 345 P.3d 145 (Haw. 2015).
15. Id.
16. See FTC v. Phoebe Putney Health Sys., 133 S. Ct. 1003, 1006 (2013) (looking to whether the
displacement of competition was the inherent, logical, or ordinary result of the exercise of authority
delegated by the state legislature in determining if a state policy to displace federal antitrust law was
sufficiently expressed).
17. Sensational Smiles, 793 F.3d at 283–84.
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public’s oral health. 18 Then, the court found a rational basis for this
regulation in its reduction of consumer health risks related to the use of
LED lights during such procedures. 19 As support for its deferential
approach to this state regulation, the court specifically made reference to
the Supreme Court’s decision in Heller v. Doe, 20 whereby a court should
uphold state action if there is any reasonable set of facts that offers a
rational basis for the action. 21 The court acknowledged that dentists had
the knowledge and experience by which to recognize any oral health
issues that could develop while performing these teeth-whitening
services. 22 The ruling was thereby perceived as helping to maintain the
public health and was partially upheld on this basis. 23
In its use of rational basis review, the Second Circuit identified other
justifications for the ruling, including several that would likely not stand
up against a stricter form of review. For example, the court identified
economic favoritism as another rational purpose to uphold the
regulation’s constitutionality, a claim that the Supreme Court
supposedly bolstered 24 in its oft-cited cases involving legislation
premised upon economic favoritism. 25 The court additionally set forth
the justification that the regulation’s likely effect of increasing the cost
of teeth-whitening services could subsidize the costs of more specialized
dental services. 26 The court repeatedly distanced itself from the process
of “choosing between competing economic theories” and “politics” in
general, yet also provided that courts will “sniff out” improper economic
protectionism if they have the preconceived intent to do so. 27 Therefore,
in upholding the Commission’s exclusionary regulation under traditional
rational basis review, the Second Circuit realized the inherent risk of
inconsistency in judicial application of this review to state occupational
regulations. 28
In Powers v. Harris, which involved a previous application of
traditional rational basis review to a similar question, the Tenth Circuit
upheld the Oklahoma Funeral Services Licensing Act, which prohibited

18. Id. at 284.
19. Id.
20. 509 U.S. 312 (1993).
21. Sensational Smiles, 793 F.3d at 284.
22. Id. at 285.
23. Id. at 285.
24. Id. at 286–87.
25. See, e.g., Williamson v. Lee Optical of Okla., Inc., 348 U.S. 483 (1955); New Orleans v.
Dukes, 427 U.S. 297 (1976); Nordlinger v. Hahn, 505 U.S. 1 (1992); Fitzgerald v. Racing Ass’n, 539
U.S. 103 (2003).
26. Sensational Smiles, 793 F.3d at 287.
27. Id.
28. Id.
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casket sellers located within the state from selling time-of-need caskets
if they did not hold a funeral director license. 29 The court provided
several justifications for using traditional rational basis review,
including the reducing of a “probing review” of state actions, a
safeguarding against courts replacing state regulations with their own
views, and respecting the concept of federalism. 30 In recognition of the
deferential nature of this review, the court explicitly disregarded the
parties’ arguments concerning the legitimate interests of the statute and
also stated that, upon the court’s discovery of a legitimate state interest,
there would be “little doubt” of the regulation’s rational relationship to
that interest. 31 The court identified intrastate economic regulation, a
state’s regulation of economic activity solely within that state, as a
proper interest and distinguished it from interstate economic
protectionism, the protection of a state’s industries from out-of-state
industries. 32 The court therefore held that a state has a legitimate
interest in protecting one intrastate industry against another. 33
In Powers, the Tenth Circuit claimed that heightened scrutiny of
economic-protectionism regulations would have far-reaching
consequences. The court did not, however, identify any of these
concerns other than a concern that the state could possibly become less
attractive to individuals seeking employment as licensed professionals.34
The court then concluded its rational basis review by simply stating that
the Oklahoma Funeral Services Act was rationally related to the interest
of protecting the Oklahoma funeral-home industry, thereby satisfying
the second part of the rational basis test. 35 No further analysis of the
Act’s relationship to the stated interest was given.
Also in Powers, the Tenth Circuit criticized the Sixth Circuit’s
rationale in Craigmiles v. Giles, 36 where the Sixth Circuit relied on
Cleburne to apply a heightened standard of review to a Tennessee
statute. 37 In Craigmiles, the Sixth Circuit addressed the Tennessee
Funeral Directors and Embalmers Act, which was similar to the
Oklahoma statute in that it allowed only licensed funeral directors to sell
caskets within the state. 38 The court considered, and ultimately rejected,

29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.

Powers v. Harris, 379 F.3d 1208, 1225 (10th Cir. 2004).
Id. at 1218.
Id. at 1217–18.
Id. at 1218–19.
Id.
Id. at 1222.
Id. at 1222–23.
Id. at 1223–25.
Craigmiles v. Giles, 312 F.3d 220, 225–27 (6th Cir. 2002).
Id. at 222.
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Tennessee’s justifications for the statute. 39 The illogical rationalizations
offered by the state included promoting public health by permitting only
licensed funeral providers, who have the proper training, to handle dead
bodies and promoting consumer protection by permitting only these
same individuals, who have the appropriate education, to dispense
advice on the caskets that would be most “protective.” 40
The Sixth Circuit primarily relied on the Supreme Court’s holding in
Cleburne as its main support for rejecting Tennessee’s stated purpose of
the law. The court specifically focused on the Supreme Court’s
directions that a municipality should craft its regulations with truly
rational bases in order to avoid arbitrary and harmful classifications.41
Without an explicit legislative reason for the difference in treatment
between licensed funeral directors and unlicensed casket sellers, the
Sixth Circuit stated that the state’s arguments would have to satisfy at
least some kind of meaningful review. 42 Since the regulation had such a
deep impact on the capitalist structure on which America was built, the
court recognized that Tennessee would have to tailor more narrowly
such regulation in order to avoid the effect of economically privileging
certain individuals at the expense of completely excluding others. 43
As stated before, the Tenth Circuit was critical of the plaintiffs’
proffered reading of Cleburne that would require a more exacting
rational basis standard. 44 The court acknowledged that one possible
reading of Cleburne could result in a requirement that this heightened
review be applied to laws that are a detriment to unpopular groups, but it
ultimately rejected this interpretation in part because the unlicensed
casket sellers did not constitute such a group. 45 Additionally, the court
did not find that Cleburne signified an exception to traditional rational
basis review because the Supreme Court did not provide guidelines for
the precise circumstances in which such an exception would apply. 46
As a result, the court, in supposedly following the Supreme Court’s lack
of direction on the matter, refused to give any credence to Cleburne’s
possible influence in modifying traditional rational basis review. 47 The
opinion, in which the court recognized several possible interpretations of
Cleburne, served little useful purpose in clarifying Cleburne for other

39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.

Id. at 225–26.
Id.
Id. at 227.
See id.
Craigmiles, 312 F.3d at 229.
Powers v. Harris, 379 F.3d 1208, 1223 (10th Cir. 2004).
Id. at 1224.
Id. at 1225.
Id.
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courts.
In contrast to the Tenth Circuit, the Sixth Circuit in Craigmiles fell in
line with the Supreme Court’s reasoning by finding that Cleburne stood
as an authorization for courts to be more critical of legislation if there is
a more direct path to the legitimate end than the one undertaken by the
legislature. 48 Therefore, the Craigmiles court was willing to adopt the
rational-basis-with-bite standard when reviewing an occupational
regulatory scheme and did so in a manner consistent with the true spirit
of Cleburne, as will be shown below.
III. DISCUSSION
A. Cleburne
As previously mentioned, some courts that have applied heightened
rational basis review have justified this application in large part with
Cleburne’s principle that the choice to use rational basis review must
actually be rational itself when the challenged classification significantly
impairs a politically unpopular group, such as the intellectually
disadvantaged or the politically powerless workforce. 49 However, the
Second Circuit completely ignored this principle in Sensational Smiles
despite the Sixth’s Circuit’s explicit reliance on Cleburne in Craigmiles,
which served as the catalyst for similar rulings by the Ninth and Fifth
Circuits. 50 This overt omission indicates that the Second Circuit has no
answer for the Sixth Circuit’s use of Cleburne, thereby lessening the
impact of the Second Circuit’s refusal to recognize any heightened form
of rational basis review. 51 Only the Tenth Circuit addressed this
specific application of Cleburne and found that Cleburne could
represent a number of possibilities, including a budding standard of
equal protection review or a simple exception to traditional rational
basis review.52 Ultimately, the Tenth Circuit did not decide what
Cleburne embodied but instead employed the traditional rational basis
standard. 53 This confusion involving Cleburne shows the need for
affirmative guidance by the Supreme Court on the proper scope of
heightened rational basis review.
Cleburne should stand for the proposition that those state
48. Craigmiles, 312 F.3d at 227.
49. Id.
50. Id.; Merrifield v. Lockyer, 547 F.3d 978, 989 (9th Cir. 2008); St. Joseph Abbey v. Castille,
712 F.3d 215, 223 (5th Cir. 2013).
51. Sensational Smiles, LLC v. Mullen, 793 F.3d 281, 285 (2d Cir. 2015).
52. Powers v. Harris, 379 F.3d 1208, 1224 (10th Cir. 2004).
53. Id.
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classifications that have the effect of impairing a politically unpopular
group deserve a review greater than mere traditional rational basis, even
if they do not deserve strict or intermediate scrutiny. 54 Professionals
prevented from performing certain services due to state occupational
regulations certainly constitute a politically unpopular group. Those
professionals who are not already established within an industry
certainly do not possess the same amount of leverage as industry
insiders. Additionally, established industry participants likely have
greater access to industry resources by which to restrict competition,
including political connections. These insiders can further use this
influence to take an active role in crafting regulations and other industry
rules, which the Supreme Court recently recognized as dangerous
because of the inherent risk of established ethical standards of a
profession intermingling with private anticompetitive purposes. 55 Such
blending of professional standards and monopolistic intentions can be
economically beneficial for only select groups of individuals—those
who are already established in an industry. 56 Due to these reasons,
industry outsiders undoubtedly constitute a politically unpopular group.
Although Cleburne involved the issue of whether state-action
immunity can protect a state regulatory board, one can see the same
concerns in the context of state regulations that force individuals to
comply with occupational requirements in order to be permitted to
perform certain services. For example, several individuals who are
“private market participants” within the architectural industry compose
the Ohio Architects Board. 57 Among its many responsibilities, the
Board has the authority to promulgate registration requirements to
practice architecture in Ohio. 58 Currently, these requirements include
satisfying education, training, and examination requisites. 59 There is
little difficulty in envisioning this Board or a similarly constructed
regulatory entity crafting regulations with a nefarious underlying
purpose, such as setting forth regulations that exclude an entire segment
of the population from performing certain services based on factors
completely unrelated to the provision of such services.
Even if state officials are overseeing a board’s regulatory activity,
these officials may be unfamiliar with the particular industry that is
54. City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 446 (1985).
55. N.C. State Bd. of Dental Exam’rs v. FTC, 135 S. Ct. 1101, 1111 (2015).
56. Id.
57. Board
Members
and
Staff,
OHIO
ARCHITECTS
http://www.arc.ohio.gov/AboutBoard.aspx (last visited Oct. 4, 2015).
58. Registration
Requirements,
OHIO
ARCHITECTS
http://www.arc.ohio.gov/RegistrationRequirements.aspx#ARC_Registration_by_Examination
visited Oct. 4, 2015).
59. Id.
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regulated and therefore may not be able to truly understand the subtle, or
perhaps even more obvious, implications of the board’s actions. Unless
officials are well versed in the competitive landscape of the architectural
industry, it is possible that they will defer to the judgments of their peers
on the Ohio Architects Board, who they will view as better equipped to
fashion appropriate industrial standards due to their specialized
knowledge and experience. A board with misguided intentions can
easily blur the line between necessary professional standards and
inappropriate protectionism of certain groups within an industry.
Legislators directly constructing occupational regulations similar to
those previously discussed also exacerbates this anticompetitive
concern. Lobbying greatly influences the American political system,
resulting in whole industries attaining both economic and noneconomic
benefits through legislation. 60 Industrial lobbying effectively eradicates
the buffer between those developing the standards for one’s profession
and the active market. 61 Therefore, legislators may be just as inclined to
favor improperly certain groups within industries as the market
participants themselves, and only the naïve believe otherwise.
B. Misplaced Reliance
In supporting its application of traditional rational basis review to an
occupational licensing scheme, the Second Circuit drew a tenuous
connection between certain Supreme Court decisions involving
economic favoritism 62 and the occupational regulation at issue before
the Second Circuit. 63 These cited Supreme Court decisions involved
state and local regulations that were more beneficial only to discrete
groups of professionals within specific industries, and the Court
accordingly held that legislative economic favoritism within this context
is permissible. 64 However, courts must draw a line between legislation
that merely benefits portions of industries and legislation that serves to
exclude completely entire segments within an industry.
In the first Supreme Court decision to find economic favoritism to be
a legitimate state interest, the Court upheld a regulation that prohibited
individuals who offered eye examinations or visual care from occupying
60. George J. Stigler, The Theory of Economic Regulation, 2 BELL J. ECON. & MGMT. SCI. 3
(1971).
61. Id.
62. Williamson v. Lee Optical of Okla., Inc., 348 U.S. 483 (1955); New Orleans v. Dukes, 427
U.S. 297 (1976); Nordlinger v. Hahn, 505 U.S. 1 (1992); Fitzgerald v. Racing Ass’n, 539 U.S. 103
(2003).
63. Sensational Smiles, LLC v. Mullen, 793 F.3d 281, 286–87 (2d Cir. 2015).
64. Williamson, 348 U.S. 483; Dukes, 427 U.S. 297; Nordlinger, 505 U.S. 1; Fitzgerald, 539
U.S. 103.

Published by University of Cincinnati College of Law Scholarship and Publications, 2018

9

University of Cincinnati Law Review, Vol. 85, Iss. 1 [2018], Art. 8

288

UNIVERSITY OF CINCINNATI LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 85

space in a retail store. 65 Although Williamson v. Lee Optical of
Oklahoma, Inc. certainly limited where “eye doctors” could offer their
services within Oklahoma, they were still not completely prohibited
from practicing their chosen occupation. 66
In similar fashion, the Court in New Orleans v. Dukes later upheld a
New Orleans ordinance that banned street vendors from the French
Quarter unless the vendor had continuously operated in these premises
for at least 8 years. 67 The Court even recognized that this “grandfather
provision” was a proper way to preserve the environment of the French
Quarter as opposed to an absolute prohibition against all street vendors,
which the Court seemed to suggest would constitute an irrational step.68
Additionally, the Court implied that the street vendors would still be
permitted to operate in other locations throughout the city. 69 The Court
ultimately found the ordinance a logical means to protect New Orleans’
stated interest, even if some of the vendors would be economically
disadvantaged by not having direct access to tourists and residents in the
French Quarter. 70
Another Supreme Court case cited by the Second Circuit in
Sensational Smiles involved the imposition of taxes on some individuals
or businesses based on factors that seemed to suggest favoritism. In
Nordlinger v. Hahn, the Court upheld a California taxing scheme on
property owners, despite the differential treatment experienced by
similarly situated owners. 71 Specifically, long-term owners could have
potentially benefited from lower taxes due to qualifying for rates that
reflected historic property values. 72 In finding the tax legislation to be
valid under traditional rational basis review, the Court acknowledged
that more recent owners, including start-up businesses, would be
severely disadvantaged. 73 However, the Court seemed to imply that this
economic disadvantage would not be so oppressive as to warrant the
overturning of this taxation scheme since these more recent property

65. Williamson, 348 U.S. at 491.
66. Id.
67. Dukes, 427 U.S. at 305.
68. Id. (“The city could reasonably decide that newer businesses were less likely to have built up
substantial reliance interests in continued operation in the Vieux Carre and that the two vendors who
qualified under the ‘grandfather clause’—both of whom had operated in the area for over 20 years rather
than only eight—had themselves become part of the distinctive character and charm that distinguishes
the Vieux Carre. We cannot say that these judgments so lack rationality that they constitute a
constitutionally impermissible denial of equal protection.”).
69. See id.
70. See id.
71. Nordlinger v. Hahn, 505 U.S. 1, 17–18 (1992).
72. Id. at 6.
73. Id. at 17.
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owners, if businesses, would still be allowed to offer their services. 74
The final case on which the Second Circuit relied entailed a state tax
that favored slot machine gambling at riverboats over racetracks.75
Much like the previous cases, the Court’s upholding of the economic
legislation in Fitzgerald v. Racing Ass’n could easily be justified on the
ground that a more difficult financial situation for racetrack gambling
does not sound the death knell for the operation of this business. The
legislation would not completely prevent racetracks from offering slot
machines at their places of business, even if there would be an obstacle
making it more difficult to compete with riverboats.
The Sensational Smiles court justified its ruling in part on the premise
that upholding the State Dental Commission’s declaratory ruling simply
continued the Supreme Court’s long line of deference to regulations
aimed at providing economic favoritism. 76 However, there needs to be
some qualification between economic protectionism on the one hand
and outright exclusion on the other. The Second Circuit offered far too
much of a categorical definition of “economic favoritism,” which it
defined as the shielding of certain groups from economic competition.77
In the Second Circuit’s view, the Supreme Court permitted “state
economic favoritism of all sorts,” and this recognition provided a
mandate by which the Second Circuit must simply give way to
preferential economic legislation regardless of the form and purpose.78
Courts cannot and should not be so willing to shirk completely their
duty in reviewing state legislation by effectively exempting an entire
class of legislation from their purview.
There are diverse levels within most categories of legislation, and
each of the laws and regulations within these classes has its own scope
and purpose. The differences between these laws and regulations can
range from subtle nuances to explicit distinctions, and the judiciary, due
to its objective nature, remains the appropriate forum in which to
recognize and judge according to these variances. There remains an
essential separation between courts and the business world that does not
necessarily exist between legislatures and commercial entities; this
division is necessary to place the judiciary in the best position to
construe legislation in a disinterested manner. With this proper role of
the courts in mind, there needs to be a better recognition of the clear
divergence between state legislation that is merely protectionist from an
economic perspective and state legislation that prohibits an entire
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.

See id. at 12–14.
Fitzgerald v. Racing Ass’n, 539 U.S. 103, 105 (2003).
Sensational Smiles, LLC v. Mullen, 793 F.3d 281, 286–87 (2d Cir. 2015).
Id.
Id. at 286.
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segment of the population from offering and rendering particular
services.
The four Supreme Court cases cited by the Second Circuit exemplify
why identifying and appropriately treating these differences is essential.
In looking back at Williamson, it is clear that limiting where “eye
doctors” could practice is not the equivalent of completely preventing
these “eye doctors” from offering their services within the state.
Presumably, these professionals could still have served the public
outside the setting of a retail store. Likewise, the street vendors in
Dukes were merely precluded from offering their fare in a specific area
within New Orleans. While this prohibition would certainly have
impaired the vendors because they would lack direct access to the
tourists who flock to the French Quarter, they would still have been able
to operate elsewhere throughout the city. Any economic disadvantage
from this regulation did not rise to the level of an absolute prohibition
on operating.
Furthermore, the taxing schemes at issue in Nordlinger and
Fitzgerald similarly imposed simple economic detriments on certain
individuals and businesses as opposed to the total exclusion of these
people and entities. As shown, the decisions constitute “an unbroken
line of precedent” 79 of the Court upholding state action that
economically favored certain groups by placing an obstacle in the path
of other groups. However, this economic obstacle could be overcome
by those determined enough to maintain their way of life or operate their
businesses. In turn, legislation that is completely exclusionary in nature
is deserving of more critical review since these regulations completely
prohibit some individuals from offering services, even in a lessened or
impaired capacity.
Occupational licensing, certification, and registration regulations
stand on the other end of the spectrum. Several of the cases in the
current circuit split demonstrate how the occupational licensing schemes
at issue completely excluded individuals from performing certain
services. Aggrieved parties could not simply move to a different
location within the state or elect to pay higher taxes, as in the Supreme
Court cases; these regulations give no middle ground to individuals and
businesses and create an all-or-nothing scenario. The definitive finality
these types of occupational regulations create should cause the courts to
view these regulations under a more exacting lens. The soul of
American capitalism relies on businesses’ relatively unrestricted ability
to offer services and innovations to the consuming public. The extreme
results that ensue from exclusionary regulations not only support the

79. Id.
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contention that the Second Circuit misplaced its reliance on the Supreme
Court’s cases purporting to support all legislation of economic
favoritism, but also justify greater judicial caution in approaching these
occupational schemes than the Supreme Court exhibited in those same
cases.
C. Consistency
Aside from the obvious inconsistencies alluded to previously, glaring
irregularities have also been experienced and, to a certain extent,
overlooked in the context of other occupational regulations crafted by
other state actors. 80 The Sixth Circuit in Wardwell v. Board of
Education became entrenched in this conflict when the Board of
Education of the City of Cincinnati imposed residency requirements,
over and above teaching certification, on the teachers it hired after a
certain date. 81 The court, bolstered by the Supreme Court in Shapiro v.
Thompson, 82 where the Supreme Court asserted that certain residency
requirements violate an individual’s constitutional right to interstate
travel, recognized a distinction between durational residency
requirements and continuing residency requirements. 83
Courts have held that durational residency requirements, which
typically entail an individual having to reside in a state for a certain
period of time to take advantage of the benefits of that state’s
citizenship, affect the fundamental right of interstate travel. 84 Therefore,
courts must assess these durational residency requirements under strict
scrutiny. 85 On the other hand, continuing residency requirements
typically mandate that an individual live within a specified area as long
as the individual is employed by a public entity. 86 The court in
Wardwell addressed the Cincinnati Board of Education’s requirement
that its teachers maintain residency within the Cincinnati School District
while employed by the Board. 87
Instead of applying any form of heightened review, the court
essentially utilized traditional rational basis review since the continuing

80. Bokhari v. Metro. Gov’t of Nashville & Davidson Cnty., 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 171103
(M.D. Tenn. Dec. 3, 2012); Bruner v. Zawacki, 997 F. Supp. 2d 691 (E.D. Ky. 2014); Shimose v. Haw.
Health Sys. Corp., 345 P.3d 145 (Haw. 2015).
81. Wardwell v. Bd. of Ed., 529 F.2d 625, 626 (6th Cir. 1976).
82. Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969).
83. Wardwell, 529 F.2d at 627.
84. Memorial Hospital v. Maricopa Cnty., 415 U.S. 250, 254 (1974).
85. Id.
86. Kennedy v. Newark, 148 A.2d 473, 475 (N.J. 1959).
87. Wardwell, 529 F.2d at 626.
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residency requirement merely affected intrastate travel. 88 The court
found a so-called “reasonable” relation between the regulation and its
purpose of hiring teachers who would be committed to enhancing urban
schooling in Cincinnati and would be more understanding of the
multitude of social issues that affected the children they educated.89
While courts have unfailingly adhered to this distinction between
durational residency requirements and continuing residency
requirements, continued adherence has the potential to develop erratic
results. 90 For example, a state or local legislative body may decide to
implement a durational residency requirement for individuals seeking to
teach within that state or municipality. A requirement that the teacher
must continuously live in a designated community would likely be
upheld under an equal protection challenge; however, given the
recognized distinction between durational and continuing resident
requirements, it is likely that the requirement that the teacher live in a
specified community before being hired would conversely be struck
down due to the perceived disparities in how the rights of individuals are
affected. Although courts would likely give these similar regulations
vastly different constitutional review, there seems to be little practical
difference between the two and no reason for such contrasting treatment.
Additionally, one could argue that occupational continuing residency
regulations also affect interstate travel, especially with communities
close in proximity to state or municipal borders.
The incongruities experienced with residency requirements are
similar to the treatment courts have given to persons deemed to be
nonimmigrant aliens. 91 Although the Fifth Circuit recognized the
Supreme Court’s application of heightened rational basis review to state
classifications based on “resident aliens” or “permanent resident aliens,”
the court simply refused to utilize this more searching review under an
equal protection challenge to a “resident alien” requirement for
Louisiana Bar applicants in LeClerc v. Webb. 92 The court’s reluctance
to afford heightened review to a challenge by nonimmigrant aliens was
based in large part on distinguishing the status of nonimmigrant aliens
from that of permanent residents. 93 The court justified more intensive
review for permanent residency classifications based on the perceived
unfairness against permanent residents given their lack of political

88. Id. at 628.
89. Id.
90. McCarthy v. Phila. Civil Serv. Comm’n, 424 U.S. 645, 647 (1976); Salem Blue Collar
Workers Ass'n v. City of Salem, 832 F. Supp. 852, 861 (D.N.J. 1993).
91. LeClerc v. Webb, 419 F.3d 405 (5th Cir. 2005).
92. Id. at 411–16.
93. Id. at 417.
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power and their economic, social, and civic similarities to regular
citizens. 94
Nevertheless, the court held that deference to state regulations
pursuant to traditional rational basis review was appropriate because of
the limited legal status of nonimmigrant aliens, given that their
admission into or departure from the United States is dependent on the
Attorney General and their inability to take advantage of certain other
benefits of full citizenship. 95 In addition, the court noted the absence of
any precedent regarding the application of heightened review to such
classifications as significant. 96
However, this contention set forth by the Fifth Circuit was
inconsistent with the Supreme Court’s prior use of rational basis review
in Plyler v. Doe, 97 in which the Court deemed children of illegal aliens
deserving of “special judicial solicitude.” 98
The Fifth Circuit
differentiated the plight of these children from the bar applicants in
Louisiana because these applicants were merely denied the opportunity
to perform certain work, not the opportunity to receive an education as
with the children in Plyler. 99 One can undoubtedly view the distinction
between the ability to work and the opportunity to receive an education
as tenuous.
In light of this guidance, the Fifth Circuit has also used LeClerc to
uphold a permanent residency requirement for licensed practical nurses
under a challenge from an individual who applied for, but had not yet
received, permanent residency status. 100 The court held that such
applicants were more similar to nonimmigrant aliens than actual
permanent residents, and the court therefore reviewed the Louisiana
State Board of Practical Nurse Examiners’ requirement under the
traditional rational basis standard. 101 This type of unfairness is
magnified when the process to obtain permanent residency status can
take up to twelve months, assuming all goes well with the process.102
One can easily understand how this nurse licensure requirement, in
conjunction with an inherently slow bureaucratic process for green card
applications, could prejudice applicants. As a result, employment
regulations that draw such tenuous distinctions based largely on factors
94. Id. at 417–18.
95. Id. at 418–19.
96. Id. at 419–20.
97. 457 U.S. 202 (1982).
98. LeClerc, 419 F.3d at 420.
99. Id. at 420–21.
100. Van Staden v. St. Martin, 664 F.3d 56, 57-58 (5th Cir. 2011).
101. Id. at 59–60.
102. Abhijit Naik, How Long Does it Take to Get a Green Card?, BUZZLE (Aug. 30, 2013),
http://www.buzzle.com/articles/how-long-does-it-take-to-get-a-green-card.html.
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outside the control of the affected individuals deserve a more involved
standard of review than mere traditional rational basis review.
This judicial splitting of state or local occupational regulations allows
courts to apply the standard of review they desire based on potentially
improper influences in favor of or against the regulation at issue. Such
discretion, in either classifying occupational regulations a certain way or
in employing one of several standards of review, has led to
inconsistency—as demonstrated among the courts of appeals—and will
continue to result in confusion for lower courts. For example, like with
durational residency requirements, a regulation limiting those who can
offer teeth-whitening services may have a negative impact on interstate
travel. In a recent case from the Supreme Court of Alabama, an
individual terminated expansion plans for his North Carolina-based
teeth-whitening business due to Alabama’s Dental Practice Act, which
would not allow the petitioner to operate this business within the
state. 103 Nevertheless, the court disposed of the petitioner’s equal
protection argument rather abruptly with minimal attention given to the
The court simply
regulation’s economic protectionist nature. 104
provided that questions on the wisdom and utility of laws are
exclusively for the legislature and are not to be undertaken by the
courts. 105 Without a consistent standard of review, courts, like the
Supreme Court of Alabama, are granted the freedom to devote as little
attention as they desire to such equal protection claims.
This ultimate judicial deference to an occupational regulation, to the
point of essentially refusing to acknowledge an equal protection
challenge, poses a problem for the politically weak portion of a state’s
workforce. Therefore, the Supreme Court should choose one common
standard to compensate for the division between applying traditional
rational basis standard on one hand and strict scrutiny in certain cases on
the other. Heightened rational basis review, alternatively known as
“rational basis with bite,” 106 would provide the means by which to
bridge the gap between this immense split. This standard would not
only provide courts the authority to be increasingly critical of truly
irrational bases for occupational regulations, but would also protect
against the incongruous outcomes that often occur as the result of
expansive judicial discretion.

103.
104.
105.
106.

Westphal v. Northcutt, 187 So.3d 684, 686 (Ala. June 5, 2015).
Id. at 695.
Id.
See Pettinga, supra note 9.
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D. Registration/Certification Requirements vs. Licensure Requirements
Although certification and registration of certain professions typically
entail a private organization “accepting” a professional in order to vouch
for that professional’s qualifications, states have been using the guise of
occupational certification and registration to prevent targeted individuals
from legally performing certain services.
Occupational regulations presumably have a large impact on a state’s
economy, and one can see an example in Ohio’s certification
requirements for a wide range of services, including the ability to
provide long-term care consultations regarding nursing facilities, the
designing of fire protection systems, and the supplying of electric on a
retail basis. 107 Similarly, Ohio mandates that initial real estate appraiser
assistants and CPA and PA accountants register to be able to perform
services within the state. 108 These regulations and a number of similar
laws have at least some effect on most of the industries involved within
the state. Court likely can vindicate the cited regulations on police
power grounds, due to the regulations’ educational and practical
experience requirements that ensure quality and ethical services are
provided to the state’s citizenry. However, greater state action in the
form occupational regulations has inherently led to the creation of some
less defensible regulatory schemes, as has been demonstrated in the
previous part.
One can recognize another such example with an Oregon Department
of Transportation requirement that an individual involved in the
“moving” industry obtain a “certificate of necessity” to operate these
services. 109 This certificate had no relation to an individual’s expertise
or knowledge within the moving industry but was rather meant to
merely give notice to existing moving companies. 110 Historically,
legislatures have imposed similar certificate-of-necessity regulations on
taxi drivers, certain medical professionals, and car salespersons.111
Commentators have convincingly argued that these regulations are
simply meant to restrict economic activity for the benefit of alreadyexisting industry “players.” 112 Such regulations provide additional
107. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 173.422 (Lexis 2016), OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3781.105 (Lexis
2016), OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4928.08 (Lexis 2016).
108. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4763.05 (Lexis 2016), OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4701.10 (Lexis
2016).
109. Timothy Sandefur, Insiders, Outsiders, and The American Dream: How Certificate of
Necessity Laws Harm Our Society’s Values, 26 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL’Y 381, 381–82
(2012).
110. Id.
111. Id. at 382.
112. Id.
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illustrations of certification regulations that do not bear any legitimate
link to a state’s police power, yet courts still generally uphold these
regulations under traditional rational basis review. Often, this standard
of review allows courts to use their creative intuition in crafting any
weak correlation to the police power. Conversely, rational basis with
bite will help to keep legislatures accountable and will restrict
imaginative judges’ use of unbridled discretion.
When compared to licensure requirements, the wide reach of state
certification and registration regulations is even more alarming because
these regulations often have much less of a reasonable connection to the
actual services that the targeted occupation generally provides.
Regardless of whether the regulation at issue would survive rational
basis with bite, there can be little dispute that the oral health concerns
discussed by the Second Circuit in Sensational Smiles justify on its face
the teeth-whitening restriction.
Additionally, the Ninth Circuit
supported its use of traditional rational basis review in Merrifield v.
Lockyer by recognizing that states are given wide latitude in regulating
economic activity within the borders of the states. 113 On the other hand,
the courts never mentioned any justification offered by the states
pursuant to the police power in any of the previously discussed cases
involving certification or registration regulations. It is certainly true that
states are generally given much deference in the exercise of the police
power, and deservedly so due to the beneficial impact of such
regulations in maintaining the health, safety, and general welfare of
citizens; 114 however, the lack of any reference to the police power in
defending certification and registration regulations underlies a lack of
true rationality in legislating many of these regulations. As a result,
since states often refuse to invoke the police power in justifying their
regulations, these regulations have shown themselves to be less
deserving of the traditional deference given to state occupational
regulations.
E. Recent Trend
Over the course of the past several years, both lower federal and state
courts have been more critical of state employment regulations in the
form of licensure, certification, and registration requirements. Even
before the circuit split developed regarding the appropriate standard of
review to apply to state licensing schemes, the Middle District of
Tennessee began a lower court movement in Bokhari v. Metro
113. Merrifield v. Lockyer, 547 F.3d 978, 989 (9th Cir. 2008) (citing New Orleans v. Dukes, 427
U.S. 297, 303 (1976)).
114. New Orleans v. Dukes, 427 U.S. 297, 303 (1976).
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Government of Nashville & Davidson County when it reviewed a county
ordinance that would have required limousine and sedan service
operators to charge a minimum fee of $45. 115 This ordinance would
have directly undermined Metro Livery’s business model of providing a
luxury car service at prices competitive with taxi companies. 116 In the
spirit of Craigmiles, the court rejected the county’s motion for summary
judgment and based its holding on the premise that protection of a
certain group from economic competition did not constitute a legitimate
purpose for the county to address. 117 The plaintiffs presented effective
arguments regarding how the ordinance’s primary purpose was to
protect “high-end” limousine services, supported by a number of
specific actions taken by the Metropolitan Transportation Licensing
Committee and the Tennessee Livery Association. 118 By recognizing
that rational basis review, “while deferential, is not toothless,” the court
gave more credence to the plaintiffs’ evidence that implied that the
government’s ordinance was nothing more than an anticompetitive
measure. 119
In similar fashion, the Eastern District of Kentucky invalidated a
Kentucky regulation requiring any individuals who provide moving
services to obtain a Certificate of Public Convenience and Necessity to
be able to legally provide such services. 120 The court heavily
scrutinized both the related protest procedures by which any existing
certificate holders could protest the granting of a new certificate and the
mandatory hearing held by the Kentucky Transportation Cabinet
Division of Motor Vehicles in the case of a filed protest. 121 The court
determined that the ability of current movers to monopolize the industry
in Kentucky by blocking out potential competitors did not have a
rational connection to the stated interest of protection of personal
property. 122 In fact, the initial application would already satisfy this
interest since individuals must show that they are “fit, willing, and able”
to operate as movers. 123 The court looked to the effectively empty
nature of the protest procedure in that an existing mover could protest an
applicant for any purpose, regardless of its correlation to the applicant’s

115. Bokhari v. Metro. Gov’t of Nashville & Davidson Cnty., 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6054, at
*2–4 (M.D. Tenn. Jan. 19, 2012).
116. Id.
117. Bokhari, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 171103, at *10–11.
118. Id. at *11–13.
119. Id. at *18.
120. Bruner v. Zawacki, 997 F. Supp. 2d 691, 693 (E.D. Ky. 2014).
121. Id. at 699.
122. Id.
123. Id.
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ability to be a mover. 124
Furthermore, the court summarily dispensed the economic
protectionist interest as an illegitimate purpose and rejected the
government’s argument that this process would lower administrative
costs as completely false, especially since the mandatory meetings held
in the case of a protest would actually increase these expenses. 125 As in
Bokhari, the court explicitly adopted a version of rational basis review
that was less deferential than the traditional form of the standard. 126 In
so ruling, the court did not strike down the entire certification process
for movers, but it did invalidate the protest aspect of the regulation. 127
In a final example of this modern movement toward a more exacting
standard of rational basis review, the Supreme Court of Hawaii held that
employer Hilo Medical Center’s rejection of a job applicant due to his
prior conviction did not comport with the purpose of a Hawaii statute
that allowed employers to consider an individual’s criminal convictions
when making employment decisions. 128 The statute explicitly provided
that employers could base a rejection on such a basis only if the
conviction record bore a rational relationship to the job position’s
duties. 129 Although the court did not invalidate or even review the state
legislative action, it did scrutinize Hilo Medical Center’s conduct as to
this individual plaintiff. 130 In its application of a “rational relationship
standard,” which was admittedly less deferential than traditional rational
basis review, 131 the court looked into not only the plain language of the
statute but also its legislative history. 132 Accordingly, the court found
that the intent of the legislature did not constitute a grant of complete
discretion to employers considering conviction records. 133
Then, the court evaluated whether the medical center established a
rational relationship between the plaintiff’s particular conviction of
possession with intent to distribute crystal methamphetamine and the
responsibilities of the position for which he applied. 134 Based on the
formal job descriptions provided by the medical center, a lack of access
to controlled substances in that position, and the potential for such a
124. Id.
125. Id. at 699–701.
126. Bruner, 997 F. Supp. 2d at 698.
127. Id. at 702.
128. Shimose v. Haw. Health Sys. Corp., 345 P.3d 145, 147 (Haw. 2015).
129. Id.
130. Id.
131. Id. at 150.
132. Id. at 150–52 (providing that “the rational relationship standard is not coextensive with the
ultra-deferential rational basis test that is used in some equal protection cases”).
133. Id. at 151–52.
134. Shimose, 345 P.3d at 150.
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broad reading of the statute to bar individuals with prior drug
convictions from having any job dealing with the public, the court held
that the medical center’s rejection was impermissible under the
statute. 135 While this court only looked to the statute’s effect on one
individual as opposed to the broader impact of the legislation, this case
exemplifies a court properly examining the underlying legislative intent
and ultimate effects of legislation on individuals seeking employment.
Additionally, the case shows that such heightened review, which
necessarily entails deeper inquiry into state legislation, would not
involve an inappropriately intensive examination of state occupational
action.
The recent movement of both federal district and state courts
employing heightened rational basis review has occurred in large part
due to a recognition of the greater potential for systematic unfairness in
occupational licensing, certification, and registration schemes,
especially given the highly regulated society in which we live. By
maintaining a proper check against such preferential and possibly
improper state legislation, courts are beginning to understand that a
more involved role helps to guard against anticompetitive regulations.
F. Scope
Like the argument for applying heightened review to occupational
licensing schemes, applying rational basis with bite to occupational
certification and registration challenges may be seen as a cause of
concern regarding the appropriate scope of such review. Specifically, a
lack of appropriate boundaries on how such heightened review is used
could lead to a “slippery slope” of courts becoming less deferential with
all forms of state economic regulation and a return to “Lochnerism.” 136
However, an already-existing test from federal antitrust jurisprudence
provides the narrow framework needed to prevent this total lack of
judicial restraint. 137 In California Retail Liquor Dealers Ass’n v. Midcal
Aluminum, the Supreme Court articulated the standard that a state
regulatory scheme must meet in order for the court to apply antitrust
immunity to sovereign actors of a state. 138 The first part of this test
should provide the proper basis for courts to make a deeper inquiry into
135. Id. at 152–54.
136. Steven Menashi & Douglas H. Ginsburg, Rational Basis with Economic Bite, 8 NYU J.L. &
LIBERTY 1055, 1103 (2014).
137. See FTC v. Phoebe Putney Health Sys., 133 S. Ct. 1003, 1006 (2013) (looking to whether the
displacement of competition was the inherent, logical, or ordinary result of the exercise of authority
delegated by the state legislature in determining if a state policy to displace federal antitrust law was
sufficiently expressed).
138. Cal. Retail Liquor Dealers Ass’n v. Midcal Aluminum, 445 U.S. 97, 105 (1980).
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state action affecting occupational qualifications. If a court finds that
state action satisfies Midcal’s clear requirement that the displacement of
occupational competition is “the inherent, logical, or ordinary result of
the exercise of authority delegated by the state legislature,” then the
court, for the reasons outlined above, should employ heightened rational
basis review in determining the constitutionality of these occupational
regulation schemes. 139
IV. CONCLUSION
The underlying split between the courts of appeals has generated
much debate and commentary regarding the appropriate standard of
review to apply for equal protection challenges to state employment
licensing schemes. This narrow focus has resulted in the judicial system
largely overlooking state anticompetitive action in the form of
employment certification and registration regulations. In light of
industry insiders often crafting these certification and registration
schemes, the unchecked process has allowed for states to legislate
economic protectionism under the guise of “rational” regulations,
leaving the already politically powerless even more vulnerable.
The result has been not only the fashioning of regulations that have
little, if any, truly rational justification, but also the production of
inconsistent results in the application of these regulations. This
unfairness, which some modern courts have already recognized, needs
to be addressed on a more consistent and effective basis. Therefore, the
Supreme Court should take the opportunity to instruct courts that
rational basis with bite is the appropriate standard of review for all state
anticompetitive action legislated as occupational licensing, certification,
and registration schemes. This standard will provide the necessary
balance between judicial exposure of truly irrational employment
regulations and prevention of a burdensome and inappropriate amount
of judicial scrutiny into state action.

139. See Phoebe Putney Health Sys., 133 S. Ct. at 1006.
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